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Abstract: We consider the problem of how an individual can use term life insurance to
maximize the probability of reaching a given bequest goal, an important problem in financial
planning. We assume that the individual buys instantaneous term life insurance with a
premium payable continuously. By contrast with Bayraktar et al. (2014), we allow the force
of mortality to vary with time, which, as we show, greatly complicates the problem.
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1. Introduction
We consider the problem of how an individual can use term life insurance to maximize the
probability of reaching a given bequest goal, an important problem in financial planning. We
assume that the individual buys instantaneous term life insurance with a premium payable
continuously. By contrast with Bayraktar et al. (2014), we allow the force of mortality to vary
with time, which, as we show, greatly complicates the problem. Please refer to Bayraktar et
al. (2014) and to Bayraktar and Young (2013) for discussions of related literature.
Bayraktar et al. (2014) determined how an individual can use life insurance to maximize
the probability of reaching a given bequest when the force of mortality is constant. To the
best of our knowledge, that paper is the first to solve any bequest-goal problem. Bayraktar
et al. (2014) considered life insurance purchased by a single premium, with and without cash
value available. They also considered irreversible and reversible life insurance purchased by a
continuously paid premium; one can view the latter as (instantaneous) term life insurance. In
this paper, we assume that instantaneous term life insurance is available to the decision maker.
2Specifically, the individual buys life insurance via a premium paid continuously and can change
the amount of her insurance coverage at any time. We believe that term life insurance is a
more realistic product than single-premium whole life insurance, and its simplicity allows us
to focus on how life insurance meets the individual’s goals. For the latter reason, too, we
assume that the financial market consists only of a riskless asset.
As in Bayraktar et al. (2014), we assume that the individual’s consumption is met by
an income, such as a pension, life annuity, or Social Security. Then, we consider the wealth
that the individual wants to devote towards heirs (separate from any wealth related to the
afore-mentioned income) and seek the optimal strategy for buying life insurance to maximize
the probability of reaching a given bequest goal. Again, this paper differs from Bayraktar et
al. (2014) in that we allow the force of mortality to vary with time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we assume that the individual
wants to maximize the probability that her wealth at death equals (or is greater than) a
given bequest level b = 1. In Section 2.1, we formalize the time-dependent problem that
the individual faces, along with a verification lemma that will help us solve the problem in
some examples. In Section 2.2, we examine the probability that the individual reaches her
bequest goal, under two different strategies for purchasing term life insurance: (1) purchasing
full insurance until death or ruin and (2) purchasing no insurance until wealth reaches a level
that guarantees wealth at death will equal the bequest goal. One may view Sections 2.1 and
2.2 of this paper as the extension of Section 3.1 of Bayraktar et al. (2014) to the case for
which the force of mortality varies deterministically with time. In Section 2.3, we consider
a discrete-time model through which one can use backwards induction to find the optimal
strategy for purchasing term life insurance. Section 3 concludes the paper.
2. Maximizing the Probability of Reaching a Bequest Goal
We begin this section by stating the optimization problem that the individual faces. In
Section 2.1, we formalize the time-dependent problem that the individual faces and present
a verification lemma that one can use to determine the optimal strategy for purchasing life
insurance. In Section 2.2, we examine the probability that the individual reaches her bequest
goal, under two different strategies for purchasing life insurance and determine the optimal
strategy in some cases. In Section 2.3, we consider a discrete-time model and present a
numerical example which shows that the general solution to the problem of maximizing the
probability of reaching a bequest goal will not be a simple one.
2.1. Statement of problem and verification lemma
We assume that the individual has an investment account that she uses to reach a given
bequest goal of b = 1 unit. This account is separate from the money that she uses to cover
3her living expenses. The individual may invest in a riskless asset earning interest at the
continuous rate r, which actuaries call the force of interest, or she may purchase term life
insurance instantaneously, as in Section 3.1 of Bayraktar et al. (2014). In two instances,
specifically, in Remark 2.5 and Proposition 2.4 below, we allow r = 0; otherwise, we assume
r > 0.
Denote the future lifetime random variable of the individual by τd. We assume that the
hazard rate λ = λ(t), or force of mortality, that governs τd is a function of time. Suppose
that λ(t) > 0 on some interval [0, T ), in which T might be infinity; furthermore, suppose that
λ(t) is non-decreasing with respect to time. The individual is aged x at time t = 0; thus,
we measure time from age x. The relationship between τd and λ is given by tpx = P(τd >
t) = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds
}
, and we assume that T px = 0, or equivalently,
∫ T
0
λ(t) dt = ∞. This
assumption is the usual one for a function to be considered a force of mortality; see Bowers
et al. (1997).
The individual buys term life insurance that pays at time τd; this insurance acts as a
means for achieving the bequest motive. She buys the term insurance via a premium paid
continuously at the rate of h(t) = (1+ θ)λ(t) per dollar of insurance for some constant θ ≥ 0.
Because the life insurance is term, we assume that the individual can change the amount of
her insurance coverage at any time; therefore, in our continuous-time model, one can consider
life insurance as instantaneous term life insurance.
Let W (t) denote the wealth in this separate investment account at time t ≥ 0. Let
D(t) denote the amount of death benefit payable at time τd in force at time t ≥ 0. With
continuously paid premium for instantaneous term life insurance, wealth follows the dynamics
{
W ′(t) = rW (t) − h(t)D(t), 0 ≤ t < τd,
W (τd) =W (τd−) +D(τd−) .
(2.1)
An admissible insurance strategy D = {D(t)}t≥0 is any non-negative process that is
independent of τd. We do not insist admissible strategies be such that W (t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0
because the individual might wish to buy insurance while risking ruin. Therefore, we modify
the definition of the maximized probability of reaching the bequest by effectively ending the
game if wealth reaches 0 before the individual dies. Define τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0 : W (t) ≤ 0}, and
define the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruin by
φ(w, t) = sup
D
Pw,t (W (τd ∧ τ0) ≥ 1) , (2.2)
in which we maximize over admissible strategies D. The notation Pw,t means that the
probability is conditional on W (t) = w; similarly, Ew,t, which we use below, means that the
expectation is conditional on W (t) = w.
4To motivate the verification lemma for this problem, we present the following informal
discussion. First, note that we can rewrite the expression for φ in (2.2) as follows:
φ(w, t) = sup
D
Ew,t
[∫ ∞
t
λ(s) s−tpx+t 1{s<τ0} 1{W (s)+D(s)≥1} ds
]
= sup
D
Ew,t
[∫ τ0
t
e
−
∫
s
t
λ(s′) ds′
λ(s)1{W (s)+D(s)≥1} ds
]
.
(2.3)
in which the indicator function 1A equals 1 if event A holds and equals 0 otherwise. By
applying Itoˆ’s Lemma (Protter, 2004), a type of total derivative, to e
−
∫
s
t
λ(u)du
φ(W (s), s),
with φ is as represented in (2.3), we obtain the following control equation, which we expect
φ to solve:
0 = max
D
[
φt + (rw − h(t)D)φw − λ(t)
(
φ− 1{w+D≥1}
)]
, (2.4)
In (2.4), the indicator function equals 0 or 1, and corresponding to each of those values, we
choose D to be a minimum because of the term −h(t)Dφw. Specifically, if the indicator equals
0, then the optimal insurance is D = 0; if it equals 1, then the optimal insurance is D = 1−w.
Thus, we can replace equation (2.4) with the equivalent expression, a variational inequality:
λ(t)φ = φt + rw φw +max [λ(t) − h(t)(1 − w)φw, 0] . (2.5)
Denote the safe level for the bequest-goal problem by w¯(t), that is, φ(w, t) = 1 for all
w ≥ w¯(t). We obtain w¯(t) by arguing as follows: after wealth reaches the safe level, the
individual uses interest income from wealth to purchase life insurance equal to 1 minus the
current wealth, and wealth will never drop to zero. Thus, the safe level w¯(s) follows the
dynamics w¯′(s) = (r + h(s))w¯(s)− h(s) for all s ≥ t; thus,
w¯(s) = w¯(t) e
∫
s
t
(r+h(s′))ds′
−
∫ s
t
h(s′) e
∫
s
s′
(r+h(s′′))ds′′
ds′.
For w¯(t) to be “safe,” we require that w¯(s) ≥ 0 for all s ≥ t; thus,
w¯(t) =
∫ ∞
t
h(s′) e
−
∫
s′
t
(r+h(s′′))ds′′
ds′ = [h]Ax+t, (2.6)
in which we use standard actuarial notation modified by a pre-superscript [h] to indicate that
we use the mortality law implied by treating h(t) as the force of mortality at time t. We use
a pre-superscript [h] in this manner throughout the paper.
These observations lead us to a verification lemma that states that a “nice” solution to
the variational inequality (2.5) equals the value function φ defined in (2.2). Therefore, we can
reduce our problem to one of solving (2.5), together with some boundary conditions. We state
the following verification lemma without proof because its proof is similar to others in the
5literature; see, for example, Wang and Young (2012a, 2012b) for related proofs in a financial
market that includes a risky asset.
Lemma 2.1. Let φˆ = φˆ(w, t) be a function that is non-decreasing, continuous, and piecewise
differentiable with respect to w and continuous and piecewise differentiable with respect to t
on R = {(w, t) : 0 ≤ w ≤ w¯(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, in which w¯(t) is given by (2.6), except that φˆ
might not be differentiable with respect to w at w = 0. (If T =∞, then t may equal T in the
limiting sense.) Suppose φˆ satisfies the following variational inequality on R:
λ(t) φˆ = φˆt + rw φˆw +max
[
λ(t) − h(t)(1 − w) φˆw, 0
]
, (2.7)
in which we use one-sided derivatives, if needed. Additionally, suppose φˆ(0, t) = 0 and
φˆ(w¯(t), t) = 1. Then, on R, φˆ equals the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal be-
fore ruin, φ. The associated optimal strategy for purchasing instantaneous term life insurance
is given by
D(w) =


1− w, if λ(t)− h(t)(1 − w)φˆw ≥ 0,
0, if λ(t)− h(t)(1 − w)φˆw ≤ 0.
Remark 2.1. To show that a candidate probability of reaching the bequest, φˆ, is maximal,
besides showing that it satisfies the regularity and boundaries conditions in Lemma 2.1, we
must show that it satisfies the variational inequality in (2.7). Specifically, we must show
that λ(t) (φˆ − 1) = φˆt + ((r + h(t))w − h(t)) φˆw and λ(t) − h(t)(1 − w)φˆw ≥ 0 wherever the
candidate strategy underlying φˆ is to buy full insurance. Similarly, we must also show that
λ(t) φˆ = φˆt + rw φˆw and λ(t) − h(t)(1 − w)φˆw ≤ 0 wherever the corresponding candidate
strategy is to buy no insurance.
2.2 Probability of reaching the bequest under two different strategies
Because, at any given moment, it is optimal either to purchase so-called full insurance,
D(t) = 1 − W (t) or to purchase no insurance, we expect that the maximum probability
of reaching the bequest will be formed from the probabilities associated with buying full
insurance until death or ruin or with buying no insurance until wealth reaches the safe level.
Denote these probabilities by φf and φ0, respectively; we use a superscript f to denote full
insurance and a superscript 0 to denote no insurance.
If the individual buys full insurance until death or ruin, then she reaches her bequest
goal if she dies before she runs out of money. Her wealth follows the differential equation
W ′(s) = (r + h(s))W (s) − h(s), W (t) = w ≥ 0,
6whose solution is
W (s) = w e
∫
s
t
(r+h(s′))ds′
−
∫ s
t
h(s′)e
∫
s
s′
(r+h(s′′))ds′′
ds′ = e
∫
s
t
(r+h(s′))ds′
(
w − [h]A
1
x+t:s−t|
)
,
for s ≥ t. Wealth reaches 0 at time tf = tf (w, t), which uniquely solves
w = [h]A
1
x+t:tf−t|, (2.8)
for 0 ≤ w ≤ w¯(t) and 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Thus, the individual reaches her bequest goal if τd occurs
before tf , or
φf (w, t) = 1− e
−
∫
tf
t
λ(s) ds
= 1− tf−tpx+t = tf−tqx+t. (2.9)
One can show that φf satisfies the boundary-value problem (BVP)
{
λ(t)(φf − 1) = φft + ((r + h(t))w − h(t))φ
f
w ,
φf (0, t) = 0, φf (w¯(t), t) = 1,
(2.10)
in which the boundary conditions follow from tf (0, t) = t and tf (w¯(t), t) = T .
For computing φfw, it will be necessary to know t
f
w, which we obtain by differentiating
(2.8) with respect to w:
∂tf
∂w
=
e
∫
tf
t
(r+h(s)) ds
h(tf )
,
which is positive, as we expected. It follows that φfw is given by
φfw(w, t) =
e
∫
tf
t
(r+θλ(s))ds
1 + θ
. (2.11)
Remark 2.2. Consider tf ’s determining equation (2.8): w = [h]A
1
x+t:tf−t|. If the individual
were to spend all her wealth w at time t to buy term insurance of 1, then tf − t is the longest
term that she could buy. In this situation, the probability that she dies with wealth equal to
1 is the probability that she dies before the end of the term tf − t, which equals the expression
for φf in (2.9): φf (w, t) = tf−tqx+t.
Now, we compute φ0, the probability that the individual reaches her bequest goal if she
buys no insurance until her wealth reaches the safe level. In this case, φ0 is the probability
that the individual survives until her wealth reaches the safe level, in which wealth follows
the differential equation
W ′(s) = rW (s), W (t) = w ≥ 0,
7whose solution is
W (s) = w er(s−t),
for s ≥ t. Wealth reaches the safe level w¯(t0) at time t0 = t0(w, t), which uniquely solves
w = e−r(t
0−t) [h]Ax+t0 , (2.12)
when e−r(T−t) ≤ w ≤ w¯(t) and 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Thus, φ0 is the probability that the individual
survives to time t0.
If 0 ≤ w < e−r(T−t), then no solution t0 of (2.12) exists; note that T is necessarily finite
if there exists w ∈
[
0, e−r(T−t)
)
. In this case, it is impossible for the individual’s wealth to
reach the safe level before she dies, so φ0(w, t) = 0. Thus, we have
φ0(w, t) =


0, if 0 ≤ w < e−r(T−t),
e
−
∫
t0
t
λ(s) ds
= t0−tpx+t, if e
−r(T−t) ≤ w ≤ w¯(t).
(2.13)
One can show that the second expression for φ0 in (2.13) satisfies the BVP{
λ(t)φ0 = φ0t + rwφ
0
w,
φ0(e−r(T−t), t) = 0, φ0(w¯(t), t) = 1,
(2.14)
in which the boundary conditions follow from t0(e−r(T−t), t) = T and from t0(w¯(t), t) = 0.
Plus, for t strictly less than a fixed t′, one can show that any φ of the form
φ(w, t) = t′−tpx+t φ
f (w er(t
′−t), t′)
satisfies the differential equation in (2.14). This probability of reaching the bequest goal
corresponds to the strategy of waiting until time t′ to buy insurance, after which time the
individual buys full term life insurance until she ruins or dies.
For computing φ0w, it will be necessary to know t
0
w, which we obtain by differentiating
(2.12) with respect to w:
∂t0(w, t)
∂w
= −
er(t
0−t)
h(t0)
(
1− [h]Ax+t0
) = − 1
h(t0)
(
e−r(t0−t) − w
) ,
which is negative, as one expects. It follows that φ0w is given by
φ0w(w, t) =
e
−
∫
t0
t
λ(s) ds
(1 + θ)
(
e−r(t0−t) − w
) , (2.15)
if e−r(T−t) ≤ w ≤ [h]Ax+t = w¯(t); otherwise, φ
0
w(w, t) = 0. If T = ∞, then (2.15) holds for
all 0 ≤ w ≤ w¯(t).
8In general, it is difficult to determine φ, but we do have the following result that extends
a similar result in the case for which the force of mortality is constant; see Proposition 3.2 in
Bayraktar et al. (2014).
Proposition 2.2. If λ(t) ≤ r for all t ≥ 0, then the maximum probability of reaching the
bequest goal before ruin is given by
φ(w, t) = φ0(w, t),
on R. The associated optimal life insurance purchasing strategy is not to purchase any life
insurance until wealth reaches the safe level w¯(t0) at time t0, after which time it is optimal to
buy term life insurance of 1− w¯(s) for all s ≥ t0.
Proof. We use Lemma 2.1 to prove this proposition. First, note that, because λ(t) ≤ r for
all t ≥ 0, in order for
∫ T
0
λ(t) dt =∞ to hold, we must have T =∞; thus, φ0 = e
−
∫
t0
t
λ(s) ds
.
Next, note that φ0 is non-decreasing with respect to w, φ0 is continuous and differentiable
with respect to w and t on R, except possibly at w = 0, and φ0 solves the BVP given in
(2.14). From Remark 2.1, all that remains for us to show is that
λ(t)− h(t)(1 − w)φ0w ≤ 0,
which, from (2.15), holds on R if and only if
e−r(t
0−t) − w ≤ (1− w)e
−
∫
t0
t
λ(s) ds
,
for all 0 ≤ w ≤ w¯(t). After substituting for w from equation (2.12) and simplifying, this
inequality becomes
e
∫
t0
t
λ(s) ds
(
1− [h]Ax+t0
)
≤ er(t
0−t) − [h]Ax+t0 ,
which holds if the following stronger inequality does:
e
∫
t0
t
λ(s) ds
(
1− [h]Ax+t0
)
≤ e
∫
t0
t
λ(s) ds
− [h]Ax+t0 ,
which is clearly true. Therefore, we have shown that φ0 in (2.13) satisfies the variational
inequality (2.7). The optimal insurance strategy follows from the fact that φ0 solves the
control problem (2.4) with D ≡ 0.
Remark 2.3. When the force of mortality is less than or equal to the force of interest,
the individual feels as if she has time to reach the safe level; therefore, it is optimal for the
9individual to invest in the riskless asset and wait until she reaches the safe level before she buys
any life insurance. For wealth w at time t, her wealth at time s ≥ t equals W (s) = wer(s−t),
and the time that wealth reaches the safe level, as measured from age x equals t0(w, t), as
discussed in Remark 2.2. The result of Proposition 2.2 generalizes what we discovered when
the force of mortality is constant; see Proposition 3.2 in Bayraktar et al. (2014).
The parallel result for the case in which the force of mortality is greater than the force
of interest is not necessarily true, that is, if λ(t) > r for all t ≥ 0, then it is not necessarily
true that φ = φf . Indeed, we saw in Bayraktar et al. (2014) for the case of constant force
of mortality, when λ > r, it is optimal to buy full insurance only when wealth is less than
a specific value, a value strictly less than the safe level; otherwise, when wealth is greater
than this specific value, it is optimal to wait to buy insurance until wealth reaches the safe
level. However, we have the following result that states that if θ = 0 and if the conditional
probability density function of the future lifetime of the person is at least r, then φ = φf .
Proposition 2.3. If θ = 0 and if the probability density function of the future lifetime of
the person aged x, namely g(t) = λ(t) tpx, satisfies g(s) ≥ r tpx for all s ≥ t ≥ 0, then the
maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruin is given by
φ(w, t) = φf (w, t),
on R. The associated optimal life insurance purchasing strategy is to purchase term life
insurance of 1− w when wealth equals w until the individual dies or ruins.
Proof. We use Lemma 2.1 to prove this proposition. First, note that φf in (2.9) is non-
decreasing with respect to w, φf is continuous and differentiable with respect to w and t on
R, except possibly at w = 0, and φf solves the BVP given in (2.10). From Remark 2.1, all
that remains for us to show is that
1− (1− w)φfw ≥ 0,
which, from (2.8) and (2.11), holds on R if and only if
A
1
x+t:tf−t| −
(
1− e−r(t
f−t)
)
≥ 0,
or equivalently, ∫ tf
t
[
λ(s) e
−
∫
s
t
λ(s′) ds′
− r
]
e−r(s−t) ds ≥ 0.
This inequality holds if the integrand is always non-negative, or
λ(s) e
−
∫
s
t
λ(s′) ds′
≥ r,
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which holds because the left side equals λ(s) e
−
∫
s
0
λ(s′) ds′
e
∫
t
0
λ(s′) ds′
= g(s) e
∫
t
0
λ(s′) ds′
= g(s)
tpx
.
Therefore, we have shown that φf in (2.9) satisfies the variational inequality (2.7). The
optimal insurance strategy follows from the fact that φf solves the control problem (2.4) with
D(t) = 1−W (t).
Remark 2.4. Note that g(s)
tpx
equals the conditional probability density function (pdf) of the
future lifetime random variable of the person aged x+ t evaluated at time s ≥ t given survival
to time t. Thus, we could have stated the condition in terms of this conditional pdf.
Remark 2.5. Recall that we generally assume r > 0, which implies that T < ∞ under
the condition of Proposition 2.3. However, if r = 0, the proof of Proposition 2.3 shows us
that when θ = 0, we have φ = φf on R for any force of mortality. If r = 0, the probability
that wealth will reach the safe level is 0. Intuitively it makes sense that it is optimal for the
individual to buy full insurance starting now rather than waiting because if the individual
waits, then the value of her account will not change, and she might die before she begins to
buy life insurance. Thus, we expect φ = φf when r = 0 for any θ ≥ 0; this result is true, as
we show in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4. If r = 0 and if θ ≥ 0, then the maximum probability of reaching the bequest
goal before ruin is given by
φ(w, t) = φf (w, t) = 1− (1− w)
1
1+θ ,
independent of t, for 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. The associated optimal life insurance purchasing strategy
is to purchase term life insurance of 1 − w when wealth equals w until the individual dies or
ruins.
Proof. Because r = 0, the expression for w in (2.8) becomes
w = 1− e
−
∫
tf
t
h(s)ds
= 1− (1− tf−tqx+t)
1+θ ,
so (2.9) implies that
φf (w, t) = 1− (1− w)
1
1+θ
for 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. The function φf (w, t) = 1− (1 − w)
1
1+θ satisfies the regularity and boundary
conditions of Lemma 2.1, and it is straightforward to show that it satisfies the inequality
1− (1 + θ)(1 − w)φfw ≥ 0,
for 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. Thus, we have shown that φf (w, t) = 1 − (1 − w)
1
1+θ satisfies the variational
inequality (2.7), and the optimal insurance strategy follows.
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Next, we present a theorem that extends the result of Proposition 2.3.
Proposition 2.5. Suppose that θ = 0 and that the probability density function of the future
lifetime g(t) = λ(t) tpx is non-decreasing on [0, T ], with T necessarily finite. Define tr =
inf{t ≥ 0 : λ(t) ≥ r}; then,
φ(w, t) =


tr−tpx+t φ
f (wer(tr−t), tr), if 0 ≤ w ≤ w(t) and 0 ≤ t < tr,
φ0(w, t), if w(t) < w ≤ w¯(t) and 0 ≤ t < tr,
φf (w, t), if 0 ≤ w ≤ w¯(t) and tr ≤ t ≤ T ,
(2.16)
on R. Here, w(t) = e−r(tr−t)w¯(tr). The associated optimal strategy for buying term life
insurance is as follows:
(a) When 0 ≤ t < tr, only buy life insurance if wealth reaches the safe level; otherwise, do
nothing until time tr.
(b) When tr ≤ t ≤ T , buy term life insurance of 1 − w when wealth equals w until one dies
or ruins, whichever occurs first.
Remark 2.6. If λ(t) ≥ r for all t ≥ 0 and if g(t) is non-decreasing, then tr = 0 and the
condition on g in Proposition 2.3 holds. Thus, it follows from Proposition 2.3 that φ = φf in
this case.
Proof. From Remark 2.6, it is sufficient to consider the case for which λ(0) < r. If g(t) is
non-decreasing, then necessarily λ(t) is increasing without bound; thus, λ(t) ≥ r for all t ≥ tr.
We use Lemma 2.1 to prove this proposition. First, note that φ in (2.16) is non-decreasing
with respect to w, φ is continuous and differentiable with respect to w and t on R, φ(0, t) = 0,
and φ(w¯(t), t) = 1.
If 0 ≤ w ≤ w(t) and 0 ≤ t < tr, then one can show that tr−tpx+t φ
f (wer(tr−t), tr) satisfies
the differential equation in (2.14). We next show that φ satisfies the inequality associated
with buying no insurance, namely
1− (1− w)φw ≤ 0, (2.17)
in which, from (2.11),
φw = tr−tpx+t e
r(tr−t) er(t
f
r−tr) = e
∫
tr
t
(r−λ(s))ds
er(t
f
r−tr),
with tfr defined by
tfr = t
f (wer(tr−t), tr).
12
For t ≤ s ≤ tr, we have λ(s) ≤ r; thus, φw ≥ er(t
f
r−tr). Thus,
w = e−r(tr−t)A
1
x+tr :t
f
r−tr
∣∣,
and (2.17) holds if the following stronger inequality holds
e−r(tr−t) A
1
x+tr :t
f
r−tr
∣∣ ≤ 1− e−r(tfr−tr),
or equivalently,
e−r(tr−t)
∫ tfr
tr
g(s)
trpx
e−r(s−tr)ds ≤
∫ tfr
tr
r e−r(s−tr)ds,
This last inequality is true because, for t < tr ≤ s,
g(s)
tpx
≤
g(tr)
tpx
≤
g(tr)
trpx
= r.
If w(t) < w ≤ w¯(t) and 0 ≤ t < tr, then the proof of Proposition 2.2 shows us that φ = φ
0
in (2.16) satisfies the inequality associated with buying no insurance until wealth reaches the
safe level, namely inequality (2.17). Finally, when t ≥ tr, from the proof of Proposition 2.3,
we know that the inequality
1− (1− w) φfw ≥ 0
holds. Thus, for t ≥ tr, the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal equals φ
f ,
which implies that it is optimal to buy full life insurance. Therefore, we have shown that φ in
(2.16) satisfies the variational inequality (2.7) on R. The optimal insurance strategy follows
as discussed above.
Example 2.1. DeMoivre’s law
Assume that λ(t) = 1
T−t
for 0 ≤ t < T , for some finite T . This force of mortality
corresponds to a future lifetime random variable T (x) ∼ U(0, T ), called DeMoivre’s law in
actuarial circles; see Bowers et al. (1997). For θ = 0, Proposition 2.5 gives us the optimal
strategy for buying insurance because the probability density function of T (x) is 1
T
, a constant,
thus, non-decreasing. Specifically, if r ≤ 1
T
(or equivalently r ≤ λ(t) for all 0 ≤ t < T ), then,
for all 0 ≤ t < T , it is optimal to buy full insurance until death or ruin, whichever comes first.
If r > 1
T
, then it is optimal to buy no insurance until time tr = T −
1
r
(unless one reaches
the safe level before that time); after time tr, it is optimal to buy full insurance until death
or ruin.
Example 2.2. Gamma law
Assume that λ(t) = µ
2t
µt+1 for t ≥ 0 and for some constant µ > 0. This force of mortality
corresponds to a future lifetime random variable T (x) ∼ Gamma(2, µ). If µ ≤ r, then we
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know, from Proposition 2.2, that φ = φ0 on R. The probability density function for T (x) is
given by g(t) = µ2te−µt, which decreases for t > 1/µ; thus, Proposition 2.5 does not apply.
Bayraktar et al. (2014) considered the case for which the force of mortality is constant,
λ(t) ≡ µ. If µ > r, then there exists a value of wealth w∗ such that if w < w∗, it is optimal
for the individual to buy full insurance, and she will do so for the rest of her life or until
she ruins. On the other hand, if w ≥ w∗, it is optimal for the individual to wait until her
wealth reaches the safe level and then begin buying full insurance, which she will do for the
remainder of her life. Moreover, the buy boundary w∗ increases with the force of mortality
µ. In the case of the Gamma law, limt→∞ λ(t) = µ, thus, we expect the limiting behavior of
the optimal strategy for purchasing life insurance to approach that bound when the force of
mortality is constant.
Indeed, in numerical work, when t is large enough and when θ = 0, the following holds
φ(w, t) = max
[
φf (w, t), φ0(w, t)
]
=


φf (w, t), if 0 ≤ w < w∗(t),
φ0(w, t), if w∗(t) < w ≤ w¯(t),
(2.18)
for some w∗(t) ∈ (0, w¯(t)) determined by continuity of φ, and w∗(t) increases with time to the
value w∗ from Bayraktar et al. (2014). We invite the interested reader to verify this result
algebraically.
For concreteness, we discuss some numerical results. Let r = 0.02 and µ = 0.05; thus,
the expected future lifetime of the individual is 2
µ
= 40. So, we have a middle-aged individual
who, on average, has forty years to reach her goal of leaving 1 unit to her heirs. For t large
enough (in this case, t ≥ 13.4), we verified numerically that φ is given by (2.18); specifically,
we checked that 1− (1−w)φfw(w, t) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ w < w
∗(t) and that 1− (1− w)φ0w(w, t) ≤ 0
for w∗(t) ≤ w ≤ w¯(t). Also, w∗(t) increases towards w∗ = 0.682, the value from Bayraktar
et al. (2014) when the force of mortality equals the constant µ. However, w∗(t) increases
only slowly towards w∗ = 0.682: w∗(25) = 0.448, w∗(40) = 0.511, and w∗(75) = 0.582. The
probability that the individual survives 75 years is only 11%, and w∗(75) is quite low relative
to w∗ = 0.682. Even when t = 150, for which the probability of survival is less than one-half
of one percent, w∗(150) = 0.630.
For small values of t, φ does not equal the expression in (2.18) because it does not satisfy
the variational inequality (2.7). In fact, it is difficult to determine what the optimal strategy
is when t is small. It appears that the maximum probability of reaching the bequest is not
made up of expressions involving φf and φ0 because it might be optimal to buy life insurance
for a while and then wait.
We now present a negative result related to a comment at the end of the preceding
example. Specifically, we show if the probability density function of the future lifetime random
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variable of the individual is decreasing, then φ 6= φf when t = tr.
Proposition 2.6. Suppose that θ = 0 and that the probability density function of the future
lifetime g(t) = λ(t) tpx is decreasing for t ≥ tr. Also, suppose that λ(tr) = r. Then,
φ(w, tr) 6= φ
f (w, tr)
for any w > 0.
Proof. Given any (w, t), (2.8) can be written
w = A
1
x+t:tf−t| = e
rt
∫ tf
t
e−rs
g(t+ s)
tpx
ds.
The condition on g implies that
g(tr + s)
trpx
<
g(tr)
trpx
= λ(tr) = r.
For any w > 0, we have tf (w, tr) > tr; thus,
w < ertr
∫ tf (w,tr)
tr
r e−rs ds = 1− e−r(t
f (w,tr)−tr).
From this inequality and from (2.11), it follows that
1− (1− w)φfw(w, tr) < 0.
In other words, the condition for buying full term life insurance does not hold for any w > 0;
thus, φ(w, tr) 6= φf (w, tr) for any w > 0.
We present another result that compares φf and φ0 near w = 0 and w¯(t) when λ(t) is
strictly increasing.
Proposition 2.7. Suppose that T = ∞ and that λ(t) is strictly increasing with respect to t.
Then, for any t ≥ tr, there exists δ > 0 such that
φf (w, t) > φ0(w, t), ∀w ∈ (0, δ), (2.19)
and there exists ǫ > 0 such that
φf (w, t) < φ0(w, t), ∀w ∈ (w¯(t)− ǫ, w¯(t)). (2.20)
Furthermore, inequality (2.19) holds when T < ∞, and inequality (2.20) holds when T < ∞
and θ > 0.
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Proof. From (2.11), we have
φfw(w, t) =
e
∫
tf
t
(r+θλ(s))ds
1 + θ
.
From tf (0, t) = t and limw→w¯(t) t
f (w, t) = T =∞, it follows that
φfw(0, t) =
1
1 + θ
,
and
lim
w→w¯(t)
φfw(w, t) =∞.
From (2.15), we have
φ0w(w, t) =
er(t
0−t)e
−
∫
t0
t
λ(s) ds
(1 + θ)
(
1− [h]Ax+t0
) .
From limw→0 t
0(w, t) = T =∞ and t0(w¯(t), t) = 0, we have
lim
w→0
φ0w(w, t) = lim
t0→∞
er(t
0−t)e
−
∫
t0
t
λ(s) ds
(1 + θ)
(
1− [h]Ax+t0
) = 0, (2.21)
and
φ0w(w¯(t), t) = lim
t0→t
er(t
0−t)e
−
∫
t0
t
λ(s) ds
(1 + θ)
(
1− [h]Ax+t0
) = 1
(1 + θ)
(
1− [h]Ax+t
) ,
in which the limit in (2.21) follows by applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule if necessary (that is, if
limt0→∞Ax+t0 = 1, which occurs if and only if λ(t) increases without bound). The conclusions
of the proposition follow from the relationships between the derivatives of φf and φ0 at w = 0
and w¯(t) and from the fact that the two probabilities are equal to 0 at w = 0 and to 1 at
w = w¯(t).
Example 2.3. In the case for which T <∞ and θ = 0, we have
lim
w→w¯(t)
φfw(w, t) = e
r(T−t),
and
φ0w(w¯(t), t) =
1
1−Ax+t
,
which we cannot order in general. For example, in the case of DeMoivre’s law, we have
Ax+t =
1− e−r(T−t)
r(T − t)
;
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thus, when t > tr = T −
1
r
,
φ0w(w¯(t), t) =
er(T−t)
er(T−t) − e
r(T−t)−1
r(T−t)
> er(T−t) = lim
w→w¯(t)
φfw(w, t),
in which the inequality follows from the fact that er(T−t) − e
r(T−t)−1
r(T−t) < 1 when t > tr. Thus,
φf (w, t) > φ0(w, t) in a neighborhood of w = w¯(t), which we already knew from Example 2.1,
where we concluded from Proposition 2.5, that φf (w, t) > φ0(w, t) for all w when t ≥ tr.
On the other hand, suppose the probability density function of the time of death of our
individual aged x is given by
g(t) = r −
2(rT − 1)
T 2
t,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . One can show that the corresponding force of mortality λ(t) is increasing and
λ(0) = r, so tr = 0. Because g(0) = r and because g(t) is decreasing, we have∫ T
0
e−rt g(t) dt <
∫ T
0
r e−rt dt,
or equivalently, Ax < 1− e
−rT , which implies that
φ0w(w¯(0), 0) =
1
1− Ax
> e−rT = lim
w→w¯(0)
φfw(w, 0).
Thus, φf (w, t) < φ0(w, t) in a neighborhood of w = w¯(t).
Example 2.4. Reconsider the Gamma law from Example 2.2. The probability density
function (pdf) increases until time t = 1/µ, after which it decreases. If µ/2 < r < µ, then
tr =
r
µ(µ− r)
>
1
µ
,
which means that the pdf is decreasing on [tr,∞). Thus, according to Proposition 2.6,
φ(w, tr) 6= φ
f (w, tr) for any w > 0 when µ/2 < r < µ. Furthermore, from Proposition
2.7, we deduce that φf (w, tr) > φ
0(w, tr) for w in an interval (0, δ); thus, (2.18) does not hold
for w ∈ (0, δ) and t = tr if µ/2 < r < µ. It follows that “when t is large enough” means some
time t greater than tr in contrast to the conclusion of Proposition 2.5.
2.3 Discrete-time model
It is instructive to compare our continuous-time model with an associated discrete-time
one. Suppose we choose a period of time, which could be very small, and we have the option
to purchase term life insurance for one period at a time, with the benefit paid at the end of
the period should death occur during that period.
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Consider the problem of maximizing the probability of reaching the bequest goal, that
is, dying with wealth at least equal to 1. In this discrete context, the objective is to maximize
the probability of having a total wealth of 1 at the end of the period of death. Let qx+k denote
the probability that an individual aged x+ k dies before time k+ 1, and let px+k = 1− qx+k
denote the probability that that individual survives to time k + 1, in which we measure age
in units of our time period. Suppose that our time-of-death random variable, as measured
from age x, has a maximum value of N so that necessarily qx+N−1 = 1. Insurance premiums
are calculated by using rates of mortality equal to q˜x+k = (1 + θ)qx+k. In place of the force
of interest r, we use a periodic effective rate of interest i. So, the cost of 1 unit of one-period
term insurance at time k equals vq˜x+k, in which v =
1
1+i
.
At any time k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, an individual with wealth w at that time will either not
purchase insurance or purchase insurance with a death benefit of
bk =
1− (1 + i)w
1− q˜x+k
,
because this amount will result in a total wealth of 1 at the end of the period, if the individual
were to die.
Determining the optimal strategy is a typical dynamic-programming problem in discrete
time. Let φ(w, k) denote the maximum probability of success of an individual with wealth
w at time k for k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. This maximum probability is calculated via backwards
induction as follows:
φ(w,N − 1) =
{
1, if w ≥ v,
0, if w < v,
and for k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 2,
φ(w, k) = max
[
px+k φ(w(1 + i), k + 1), qx+k + px+k φ
(
w(1 + i)− q˜x+k
1− q˜x+k
, k + 1
)]
.
The optimal strategy is not to purchase one-period, term life insurance at time k when the
maximum is the first term in the expression on the right, while the optimal strategy is to
purchase bk units of life insurance when the maximum is the second term in the expression
on the right.
The optimal strategy in this model can be quite different from what one might expect. In
the discrete-time model, an individual is forced to wait if her wealth is insufficient to purchase
insurance for one complete period, even though her success probability could be increased by
using the available wealth to purchase insurance for part of a period, if this were allowed.
It is possible for the optimal strategy to dictate buying in one period and waiting in a
subsequent one. Take, for example, a case with N = 3, qx = 0.3, qx+1 = 0.4, i = 1, and θ = 0.
For an individual who starts with a wealth of 0.3 at time 0, the optimal strategy is to buy at
time 0, but then wait at time 1.
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3. Summary and Conclusions
We examined the optimal strategy for purchasing instantaneous term life insurance in
order to maximize the probability of reaching a given bequest goal, an important problem in
financial planning. We showed that if the force of mortality is no greater than the return of
the riskless asset, then it is optimal to wait until reaching the safe level before buying any
life insurance. On the other hand, if the rate of return of the riskless asset equals 0, then we
showed that it is optimal to buy so-called full term life insurance until death or ruin. We also
determined the optimal strategy when the probability density function of the future lifetime
random variable is non-decreasing, which is to wait until the force of mortality surpasses the
return of the riskless asset and then purchase full term life insurance until death or ruin.
Furthermore, we discussed a discrete-time version of the bequest problem and showed that
the results in discrete time do not necessarily match those in continuous time because of the
restriction of buying life insurance discretely.
In future work, we will consider two extensions: (1) we will allow the individual to
consume from her investment account as she finds the optimal strategy for purchasing life
insurance to maximize the probability of reaching her bequest goal; and (2) furthermore,
we will allow the individual to buy life annuities to cover her consumption, again, as she
maximizes the probability of reaching her bequest goal. We also anticipate adding a risky
asset to the financial model in these two extensions, which will introduce an additional control
to the problem.
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